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«$$ Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Johnson v. Rogers and Newspaper Agency 
Corporation, Case No, 20622 
Dear Mr* Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, plaintiffs/appellants hereby submit the attached opinion 
by the Utah Court of Appeals as additional support of their 
argument regarding the standard for imposition of punitive 
damages, which argument is set forth at pages 11 through 16 of 
their Opening Brief and pages 1 through 7 of their Reply Brief in 
this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Ju (Wrist 
JCA:ks 
JulAa C. Attwood 
fd 
cc: Edward J, McDonough 
Lowell V. Smith 
P. Keith Nelson 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Royce Biswell, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) OPINION 
) (For Publication) 
v. ) 
Diane G. Duncan, ) Case No. 860124-CA 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
p- a « r- «*-v 
r * F n 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Orme. nn^i ^-07 
A u u i <5 bo/ 
BILLINGS, Judge: , / ' v " ; - ' ! ~ r l ' : \ 
^
 # ' LV:5: Court c\ Aj.^iwi!^ 
Appellant Royce Biswell ("Biswell") appeals from the 
district court's judgment granting respondent Diane Duncan's 
("Duncan's") motion for partial summary judgment dismissing 
Biswell*s punitive damage claim against Duncan, an intoxicated 
driver, and the court's refusal to give Biswell''s proposed jury . 
instruction regarding the extent of Duncan's liability for 
aggravating Biswell's pre-existing back injury. We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Biswell sustained injuries when her car was hit by Duncan, a 
drunken driver, at the intersection of 5065 West and North Temple 
in Salt Lake City. Subsequent to the accident, Duncan was 
arrested and convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol, 
having a blood alcohol content of .10 percent in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1987). 
Prior to the accident, Biswell suffered from degenerative 
changes in her spine and upper back. Biswell testified that this 
condition and other ailments had been "taken care of" prior to the 
accident and that she suffered no symptoms. Biswell claims that 
it was only after the accident that she experienced the pain and 
discomfort she currently experiences in her lower back. Biswell 
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contends that the accident aggravated or "lit up- this latent 
condition causing permanent partial disability. 
Biswell brought a civil action against Duncan seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages. Duncan filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment claiming that punitive damages were not 
recoverable in the context of drunk driving as a matter of law. 
Although Duncan's motion was captioned one for -partial summary 
judgment/w both parties and the trial judge, in his memorandum 
decision, treated it as a motion for partial judgment on the 
pleadings. No factual development of Duncan's prior driving 
record, her behavior and attitude while drinking, or her conduct 
at the scene of the accident was presented to the court.1 The 
parties focused exclusively on whether the standard for an award 
of punitive damages in Utah requires a finding of -actual malice" 
(intent to injure) or -legal malice- (reckless disregard of the 
rights of others). 
The district court removed the issue of punitive damages 
from jury consideration ruling that punitive damages in Utah can 
be awarded only if -actual malice- or -malice in fact- is 
established. The issue of compensatory damages was tried to the 
jury. The trial court refused to give Biswell's proposed jury 
instruction on aggravation of a pre-existing condition. The jury 
awarded special'damages of $436.63 and general damages of 
$500.00. This appeal ensued. 
Three issues are presented on appeal. First, was the trial 
judge correct in ruling that punitive damages are not recoverable 
against this drunken driver because "actual malice- or -factual 
malice- was not pled? Second, does the imposition of punitive 
damages in a civil suit against a drunken driver contravene Utah's 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy? Third, did 
the trial court correctly instruct the jury as to the extent of a 
tortfeasor's liability for "lighting up" a pre-existing latent 
condition? 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Biswell argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her 
claim for punitive damages, as a matter of law, ruling that 
1. The only fact presented to the trial court was that Duncan 
was arrested and convicted for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. This was uncontested in the pleadings. The record on 
appeal indicates that Duncan had her license revoked for a 
prior DUI conviction. This fact, however, was not argued by 
counsel nor considered by the court on Duncan's partial summary 
judgment motion. 
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she had not pled/ and conceded she could not prove, -actual 
malice- or intent to injure. The issue of whether punitive 
damages can be imposed against drunken drivers in a civil 
action is one of first impression in Utah. 
A. 
To resolve the issue of whether punitive damages are 
recoverable in this State against intoxicated drivers, an 
examination of the relevant law in other jurisdictions is 
instructive. To date, twenty-two out of twenty-seven 
jurisdictions to consider the -question have held that punitive 
damages may be assessed against the drunken driver in a civil 
proceeding: Alabama (Fritz v. Salva, 406 So.2d 884 (Ala. 
1981)); Arizona (Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900, 
904 (1976)) (citing Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 
(1929)); Arkansas (Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 
293, 3 A.L.R.2d 203 (1948)); California (Tavlor v. Super. Ct. 
of Los Angeles County, 24 Cal.3d 890, 598 P.2d 853, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 693 (1979)); Connecticut, (Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 
506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964)); Delaware (Walczak v. Healv, 280 A.2d 
728 (Del. 1971)); Florida (Ingram v. Petit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 
1976)); Georgia (Chitwood v. Stoner, 60 Ga. App. 599, 4 S.E.2d 
605 (1939)); Illinois (Madison v. Wjgal, 18 111. App. 564, 153 
N.E.2d 90 (1958)); Iowa (Nichols v. Hocke, 297 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 
1980)) (citing Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 
(1954)); Kentucky (Wiggington's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 
217 S.W. 933 (1920)); Minnesota (Hawkinson v. Gever, 352 N.W.2d 
784 (Minn. 1984)); Mississippi (Southland Broadcasting Co. v. 
Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So.2d 572 (1951)); Missouri (Smith v. 
Savles, 637 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. App. 1982)) (remanded punitive 
damages issue to provide plaintiff an opportunity to develop 
and present evidence on intoxication); Montana (Allers v. 
Willis, 197 Mont. 499, 643 P.2d 592 (1982)); New Mexico 
(Sveicara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (N.M. App. 
1971));.New York (Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 
306 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973)); North Carolina (Huff v. Chrismon, 68 
N.C. App. 525, 315 S.E.2d 711 (1984)); Oregon (Harrell v. Ames, 
265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973)); Pennsylvania (Focht v. 
Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970)); but see Harvey 
v, Hassinger, 315 Pa. Super. 108, 461 A.2d 814, 816 (1983) 
(noting that Focht was decided prior to the effective date of 
the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, which 
became effective July 19, 1975); Tennessee (Pratt v. Duck, 28 
Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945)); Texas (Crider v. 
Appelt, 696 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985)). 
The jurisdictions that have held that punitive damages 
are not recoverable against the drunken driver are generally 
governed by a standard of punitive damages requiring "actual 
malice" or "malice in fact." See Comment, Punitive Damages and 
860124-CA 3 
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the Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine L. Rev , 11 ), 1 38 (1980).2 
These courts generally require "that state of mind under which 
a person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, a 
spirit of revenge, retaliation, or a deterraination to vent 1: 11 IL:. 
feelings upon other persons'* before awarding punitive damages. 
Detling v. Chocklev, 70 Ohio St, 2d 134, 436 N.E.2d 208, 210 
(1982) (quoting Columbus Finance v. Howard, 4 2 Ohio St.2d 1 78, 
2 84, 3 27 N.E.2d 6 54, 658 (1975)). 
B. 
Because the standard for an award of punitive damages in 
Utah is determinative of our holding, we review the history of 
punitive damage s i n 1J t a 1 i. Pri or to 1979, punitive damages 
could be imposed only after a finding of "actual maliceM or 
"malice in fact." See, e.g., Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 
(Utah 1975); Palombi v. D & C Builders , 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 
P.2d 325 (Utah 19fi9> • Powers v. Tavlor, ] 1 I Jt< ih 2d 152 
2. These jurisdictions include: Kansas (Gesslein v. Britton, 
175 Kan, 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954)) (gross and wanton negligence 
must be alleged); Ohio (Detling v, Chocklev, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 
436 N.E.2d 208 (Ohio 1982)) (Punitive da.rn.ages are not recoverable 
based on evidence of intoxication alone. Actual malice is 
required which means defendant's actions must have been 
intentional and deliberate or have the character of outrage 
frequently associated with cri m e . ) ; Oklahoma (Ruther v. Tvra, 207 
Okla. 112, 2,4.7 P. 2d 9 64 (1952)) (act must be accompanied with. 
evil intent or the result of such gross negligence, such 
disregard of another's rights, as is deemed the equivalent of 
such in ten t) ; a. n d V i r g i n i a, (Baker v, Marcus , 2 01 V a . 9 0 5, 114 
S.E.2d 617 (I960)) (court refused to award punitive damages 
against the intoxicated driver holding that punitive damages are 
allowed only where conduct is done with malice, recklessness, or 
negligence that evinces a conscious disregard of the rights of 
others). Although Maryland has addressed the issue of punitive 
damages i n the drunk driving context, the standard for an award 
of punitive damages currently used by the Maryland courts in 
drunk driving cases is ambiguous. See Giddings v. Zellan, 160 
F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir, 1947) (applying Maryland law), cert, denied, 
332 U.S. 759, 68 S.Ct. 61, 92 L.Ed. 345 (1947) (actual malice 
required before punitive damages can be assessed against the 
drunken driver); but see Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A. 2 d 
6 9 9 (19 4 4); Smith v, Gray Concrete Co, Ins., 267 Md 3 49 297 
A.2d 721 (] 9 72) . 
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379 P.2d 380 (1963); Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 
(1962); Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960); 
Evans v. Gainsford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952); Murphv v. 
Booth, 36 Utah 285, 103 P. 768 (1909). In these cases, "actual 
malice- or -malice in fact" was defined as willful and malicious 
misconduct and described as an act done with evil intent and 
with the purpose of injuring. See Kesler, 542 P.2d at 539; see 
also McFarland v. Skaoos Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298, 303 n.ll 
(Utah 1984). 
In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
articulate the proper standard to be applied in assessing 
punitive damages in false imprisonment cases. Terry v. Zions 
COOP. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). The supreme 
court held that in false imprisonment cases the defendant need 
not manifest -actual malice- or -malice in fact.- Rather, 
malice could be implied from conduct. 
This presumed malice or malice in law 
does not consist of personal hate or ill 
will of one person towards another but 
rather refers to that state of mind which 
is reckless of law and of the legal 
rights of the citizen in a person's 
conduct toward that citizen. Therefore, 
in false imprisonment cases the defendant 
need not act with actual ill will or 
hatred toward the person being confined. 
In such cases malice in law will be 
implied from unjustifiable conduct . . . . 
Id. at 327. This -reckless disregard- standard was extended to 
tort cases other than false imprisonment cases in Branch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 277 (Utah 1982) 
(improper disposal of waste water). The supreme court, citing 
Terry, held that punitive damages may be awarded when one acts 
with reckless indifference and disregard of the law and his 
fellow citizens. Id. The -actual malice- QT_ "reckless 
disregard1* standard was reaffirmed in Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
HQSP., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983): 
A defendant's conduct must be malicious ox 
in reckless disregard for the rights of 
others, although actual intent to cause 
*'
:
 " injury is not necessary. 
Id, at 1186 (emphasis added). 
In 1984 the supreme court reconsidered its position in 
Terry and adopted a different standard for the imposition of 
860124-CA 5 
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punitive damages in false imprisonment cases: 
[W]e adopt as the appropriate 
standard for determining the 
availability of a punitive damage 
award in an action for false 
imprisonment that of Hmalice in fact" 
or -actual malice.w 
McFarland, 678 P.2d at 304. However, the language and 
reasoning of McFarland is limited to false imprisonment cases. 
This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that the supreme 
court has since cited the Hactual maliceM ox Hlegal malice* 
standard with approval in cases — other than false imprisonment 
cases — subsequent to McFarland: Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Utah 1985) 
("Punitive damages, among other things, punish conduct which 
manifests a knowing or reckless indifference toward, and 
disregard of, the rights of others."); Atkin, Wright & Miles v. 
The Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985) 
("Before punitive damages can be awarded, the plaintiff must 
prove conduct that is willful and malicious or that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference and disregard towards the 
rights of others."). 
In light of the aforementioned authority, we conclude 
that the standard for an award of punitive damages in cases 
other than false imprisonment cases in Utah is "actual 
malice/malice in fact" ex "legal malice," i.e., conduct that 
manifests a reckless disregard or indifference to the rights 
and safety of others. 
States with a standard for the imposition of punitive 
damages similar to Utah have consistently permitted punitive 
damages to be assessed against the drunken driver in the 
appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Smith v. Chapman, 115 
Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900, 903-04 (1977); Hawkinson v. Gever, 352 
N.W.2d 784, 788 (Minn. App. 1984); Allers v. Willis, 197 Mont. 
499, 643 P.2d 592, 596 (1982); Sveicara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 
739, 487 P.2d 167, 169 (N.M. App. 1971); Huff v. Chrismon, 68 
N.C. App. 525, -315 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1984); Harrell v. Ames, 265 
Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211, 215 (1973). 
C. 
The imposition of punitive damages against the drunken 
driver under appropriate circumstances is harmonious with 
Utah's public policy, evidenced by recent legislation. As 
stated by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Huff v. 
Chrismon, 68 N.C. App. 525, 315 S.E.2d 711 (1984): 
860124-CA 6 
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There appears to be a growing trend in 
this State to maximize the punishment 
and deterrence which impaired drivers 
are subjected to. This trend is seen in 
the recent enactment of the -Safe Roads 
ActM with its stiff penalties for 
impaired drivers. This State's growing 
concern and outrage stemming from 
injuries and deaths caused by impaired 
drivers is further seen in our courts' 
recognition of a common law dram shop 
liability. 
We believe that punitive damages, when 
used in conjunction with the sanctions 
of the -Safe Roads Act,- are consistent 
with the trend to maximize punishment 
and deterrence of impaired drivers and 
would have a far reaching impact. 
Id, at 715 (citations omitted). 
Cognizant of the grave problems drunk driving poses, the 
Utah Legislature has enacted one of the strongest impaired 
driving laws in the country. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44 -
41-6-44.20 (1987). In addition, the 1981 Legislature passed 
the -Dram Shop ActM which imposes liability for those who 
provide intoxicating liquors which result in injuries to third 
persons. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 (1986). These statutes 
represent a legislative determination that public safety is 
gravely endangered when a person operates a motor vehicle after 
consuming alcoholic beverages. 
Assessing punitive damages against drunken drivers is 
also consistent with the historical objectives of punitive 
damages. The most commonly cited objectives for punitive 
damages are: the punishment of the defendant, the deterrence of 
the defendant from further offense, the deterrence of others 
from similar conduct, and the vindication of society. See 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc. 675 P. 2d at 1186; see 
also Peterson v. Super. Ct. of Ventura County, 31 Cal.3d 147, 
642 P.2d 1305, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1982); Sebastian v. Wood, 
246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 
P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979). The possibility of an award of punitive 
damages may induce the victim, not otherwise willing to proceed 
because of the trouble and expense, to take action against the 
intoxicated driver. See Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349 
N.Y.S.2d. 306, 308 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973). Since punitive 
damages are usually paid by the defendant personally 
860124-CA 7 
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and not by insurance/3 the possible imposition of punitive 
damages may well be a more effective deterrent than any 
possible criminal penalty which may be imposed. See Colligan, 
76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 310 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973). 
Legal scholars and commentators also advocate the 
imposition of punitive damages against drunken drivers. See, 
Comment, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine 
L. Rev. 117 (1980); Note, Torts-Damages-The Drinking Driver and 
Punitive Damages, 7 Wake Forest L. Rev. 528 (1971); Comment, 
Damages-Intoxicated Driver-Punitive Damages, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 
645 (1961); Comment, Punitive - Damages and their Possible 
Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 Va. L. Rev. 
1036 (1960). 
After careful examination of the authorities on this 
question, we hold that punitive damages are recoverable against 
a drunken driver in an automobile personal injury case where it 
can be established (1) that the defendant motorist acted with 
actual malice or a reckless disregard of the rights and safety 
of others, and (2) that his drunken driving was a contributing 
cause of the accident. We believe that one who drives a car 
after voluntarily drinking to excess, with its great potential 
for causing serious injury, could be found, under proper 
circumstances, to demonstrate a -reckless indifference to the 
rights of othersH sufficient to allow the issue of punitive 
damages to be considered by the trier of fact. See Taylor v. 
Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 24 Cal.2d 890, 598 P.2d 853, 
157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979). We do not, however, hold that the 
mere finding that a driver who was involved in an accident was 
convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1987) would allow the 
issue of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury.4 
3. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co, v. McNulty, 
307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). 
4. [T]he violation of a statute is not sufficient 
per se to allow an award, whether or not the 
statute carries a criminal penalty, since the 
violation of a statute by itself does not 
necessarily indicate sufficient [actual malice 
or reckless indifference towards the rights of 
others]. However, violation of a statute may 
be considered as evidence of [actual malice or 
reckless indifference towards the rights and 
safety of others]. 
Comment, Punitive Damages and their Possible 
Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 Va. 
L. Rev. 1036, 1047 (1960). Furthermore, causation must 
also be established. 
860124-CA 8 
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Our holding that punitive damages may be 
assessed against the drunken driver under some 
circumstances is supported by persuasive statistical 
data linking drunken drivers with a high incidence of 
traffic accidents and traffic fatalities. The 1983 
Final Report of the Presidential Commission on Drunk 
Driving states: 
At least 50 percent of all highway deaths 
involve the irresponsible use of alcohol. 
Over the past ten years, 250,000 Americans 
have tragically lost their lives in 
alcohol-related crashes. Conservative 
estimates place the annual economic loss at 
$21 billion, while others run as high as $24 
billion. There is, of course, no way to 
measure the loss of human lives. 
In single vehicle fatal crashes, for which 
fault can be more easily ascertained than in 
multiple vehicle crashes, upwards of 65 
percent of those drivers who died were 
legally under the influence, i.e., their 
alcohol level was above 0.10. Furthermore, 
more than half of the drunk drivers who were 
involved in fatal crashes had blood alcohol 
concentrations (BACs) twice that of the 
legal limit. The average BAC of these drunk 
drivers was 0.20. 
/ 
This becomes even more significant in light 
of the fact that only one in five hundred 
(1/500) to one in two thousand (1/2000) 
drivers on the road with a BAC greater than 
0.10 are arrested for driving under the 
influence. The low likelihood of arrest, 
and a lenient judicial attitude fostered by 
a misperception of the seriousness of the 
offense, are important factors in 
perpetuating the nation's drunk driving 
problem. 
1983 Final Report of the Presidential Commission on Drunk 
Driving at 1. 
Because the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that 
punitive damages cannot be imposed against drunken drivers 
absent a finding of actual malice, there was no occasion for 
development of the factual record in the proceedings below. 
The trial court did not focus on whether additional facts 
regarding Duncan's conduct could be discovered and presented 
which would have allowed a jury to conclude (1) that Duncan's 
860124-CA 9 
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conduct demonstrated a "reckless indifference to the rights and 
safety of others," and (2) that her intoxication was a cause of 
the accident. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
D. 
Because we remand for further proceedings, we attempt to 
provide some guidance to the trial court.5 See Utah Farm 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 158 (Utah 
1987); see also R. Utah Ct. App. 30(a). Case law 
overwhelmingly concludes that -whether punitive damages are 
awarded is generally a question of fact within the sound 
discretion and province of the jury. Smith v. Chapman, 115 
Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900, 905 (1977); Mince v. Butters, 616 P.2d 
127, 129 (Colo. 1980); Infeld v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 506, 199 
A.2d 693, 695 (1964); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 
841, 845 (1954); Moore v. Bothe, 479 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1972); Powers v. Tavlor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380, 382 
(1963); Wilson v. Oldrovd, 1 Utah 362, 267 P.2d 759, 766 (1954). 
A jury should be instructed that punitive damages can be 
imposed only after establishing that the drunken driving was a 
cause of the injury and that the defendant motorist acted with 
Mactual maliceM or "legal malice," i.e., a reckless 
indifference to the rights and safety of others. In addition, 
it must be remembered that M[t]he trier of fact is not required 
to award punitive damages in a case in which they are 
permissible, and it is error for a trial judge to instruct the 
jury that punitive damages must be given." Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 908 comment d (1979); accord, C. McCormick, 
Handbook on the Law of Damages, § 84 (1935). 
Moreover, if reasonable minds could not differ in 
concluding that Duncan's intoxication was not a cause of the 
accident and subsequent injuries, or that Duncan's conduct did 
not meet the standard of "legal malice," or a "reckless 
indifference towards the right and safety of others," the court 
5. We resist the temptation to provide further guidance by 
suggesting specific kinds of behavior which, if present, should 
point to or away from an award of punitive damages in an 
accident caused by a driver who is intoxicated. We believe it 
is best to move cautiously and permit application of the legal 
standards set forth herein on a case-by-case basis. 
860124-CA 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should eliminate the issue of punitive damages as a matter of 
law,6 See Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Duncan claims that the imposition of punitive damages in 
this civil suit against her, where a criminal penalty was 
assessed for the same conduct, contravenes the prohibition 
against double jeopardy, Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Duncan 
contends that she will be punished twice for the same wrong. 
An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have 
addressed this issue have ruled that the imposition of punitive 
damages does not contravene double jeopardy proscriptions. 
See, e.g. , Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman 
Associates, Inc., 108 N.J. Super. 137, 260 A.2d 248 (1970); 
Sveicara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (1971); Roshak 
v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560.P.2d 275 (1977); g&& also Oleck, 
Damages to Persons and Property (rev. ed. 1961), § 270; 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 908 comment a (1979); Note, Torts-
Damages-The Drinking Driver and Punitive Damages, 7 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 528, 531 (1971). 
Several Utah cases have awarded punitive damages in cases 
where the same conduct could be punished criminally. E.g. , 
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Holdawav v. Hull, 
505 P.2d 295 (Utah 1973); Evans v. Garsfad, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah 
1952). 
Other jurisdictions in drunken driving cases have 
specifically rejected the double jeopardy argument. Peterson 
v. Super. Ct of Ventura County, 31 Cal.3d 147, 642 P.2d 1305, 
181 Cal Rptr. 784 (1982); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 
S.W.2d 293 (1948); Sveicara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 
6. Relying principally on an exchange between the court and 
Duncan's counsel during argument for modification of the 
court's order dismissing the punitive damages claim, Biswell 
suggests the court would have ruled the same way even if it 
viewed the case from the perspective of the "reckless 
disregard" standard. Since the trial court's focus was so 
clearly on which standard applied, we are not persuaded by this 
argument. Moreover, the factual record was not sufficiently 
developed to have permitted an informed decision that Duncan 
did not act in "reckless disregard" as a matter of law. 
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167 (1971); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 
(1945).7 We agree with the majority. 
We are persuaded that the constitutional immunity from 
double jeopardy is limited to criminal proceedings. Comment,. 
Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine L. Rev. 
117, 130 (1980). A punitive damage award is civil in nature. 
Thus, although the award of punitive damages is a type of 
penalty imposed to deter wrongful conduct, M[t]he authorization 
to award exemplary damages . . . does not convert a civil 
action into a criminal action insofar as it affects 
constitutional protections in criminal proceedings.- Peterson 
v. Super. Ct. of Ventura County, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 162, 642 P.2d 
1305, 1313, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 792 (1982) (quoting People v. 
Super. Ct.. 12 Cal.3d 421, 433, 525 P.2d 716, 115 Cal. Rptr. 
812 (1974). 
We find that the imposition of punitive damages against a 
drunken driver in a civil action, who may also be punished 
criminally for the same conduct, does not violate the double 
jeopardy prohibition in Utah's Constitution. 
-LIGHTING UP" PRE-EXISTING CONDITION 
On appeal,- Biswell further contends that the trial court 
committed reversible error by incorrectly instructing the jury 
on the extent of Duncan's liability for aggravating or 
Mlighting upM Biswell1s pre-existing asymptomatic back 
condition. 
Failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes 
reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the 
jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or 
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law. In 
re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96-97 (Utah 1985). A party 
is entitled to have his theory submitted to the jury but it is 
not error when requested instructions are fully covered in the 
other instructions given. Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455, 
458-59 (Utah 1981). Instructions should be read in their 
entire context and given meaning in accordance with the 
ordinary and usual import of the language as it would be 
understood by lay jurors. Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 
412 P.2d 451, 452-53 (1966). 
Although Biswell suffered from degenerative changes in 
her spine prior to the accident, at trial she claimed that her 
prior conditions and ailments had been resolved and that she 
suffered no symptoms before the accident. Biswell alleged that 
7. Only a small minority, including Indiana and Nebraska, 
prohibit punitive damages where a tort is also a crime. Roshak 
v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560 P.2d 275, 277-78 (1977). 
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it was only after the accident that she experienced the pain 
she currently endures in her lower back. This was her theory 
of the case and she had a right to have it fairly presented to 
the jury. 
The rule is well settled that when a defendant's 
negligence aggravates or lights up a latent, dormant,- or 
asymptomatic condition, or one to which the injured person is 
predisposed, the defendant is liable to the injured person for 
the full amount of damages which ensue, notwithstanding such 
diseased or weakened condition. In other words, when a latent 
condition itself does not cause pain, but that condition plus 
an injury brings on pain by aggravating the pre-existing 
condition, then the injury, not the dormant condition, is the 
proximate cause of the pain and disability. A plaintiff, 
therefore, is entitled to recover all damages which actually 
and necessarily follow the injury. See Owen v. Dix, 30 Ark. 
189, 196 S.W.2d 913, 915 (1946); C, F. Hamblen, Inc. v. Owens, 
172 So. 694, 696 (Fla. 1937); Jones v. Citv of Caldwell, 20 
Idaho 5, 116 P. 110, 113 (1911); Becker v. D & E Distributing 
Co., 247 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Iowa 1976); Holt v. McCann, 58 Tenn. 
App. 248, 429 S.W.2d 441, 445 (1966); Brunson v. Strong, 17 
Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451, 453 (1966); Bennett v. Messick, 76 
Wash. 2d 474, 457 P.2d 609, 612 (1969). 
Having ascertained the extent of a tortfeasor's liability 
for aggravating a dormant condition, we must determine whether 
the trial court properly instructed the jury on this issue. 
Instruction No. 17 given by the trial court states: 
You are instructed that the damages that may 
be assessed in this case should not be reduced 
simply because the plaintiff may suffer from a 
pre-existing or abnormal condition. If you 
find that the plaintiff suffers from an 
abnormal or pre-existing condition which has 
not been proximately caused by the accident, 
even though it may invite your sympathy, you 
may not assess any damage against the 
defendant for that condition. However, if the 
accident has been the proximate cause of 
aggravating such pre-existing condition, that 
should be considered bv vou in determining 
general damages. (Emphasis added.) 
are persuaded that the instruction given by the trial 
not a clear statement of the law under Biswell's 
We 
court was 
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theory of the case.8 On remand the court should give an 
instruction which clearly expresses the concept that if 
Duncan's negligence aggravated or lit up Biswell*s dormant 
asymptomatic condition, then Biswell is entitled to recover all 
the damages which follow. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
8. The instruction proffered by Biswell containing her theory 
of the case states: 
Plaintiff, Royce Biswell, may not recover 
damages for any pre-existing condition or 
disability she may have had which did not result 
from any fault of the defendant, but she is 
entitled to recover damages for any injury she 
suffered, including any aggravation or lighting 
up of such a pre-existing condition or 
disability, which was proximately caused by 
defendant's negligence. 
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